Agricultural Production Organization in Transition Economies and the Role of Human Capital: Evidence from Romania by Rizov, Marian
 
Agricultural Production Organization in 
Transition Economies and the Role of Human 














Paper prepared for presentation at the X
th EAAE Congress 
‘Exploring Diversity in the European Agri-Food System’, 











Copyright 2002 by Marian Rizov. All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this 
copyright notice appears on all such copies. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ORGANIZATION IN 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES AND THE ROLE OF HUMAN CAPITAL: 
EVIDENCE FROM ROMANIA 
Marian RIZOV* 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium 
Abstract: 
This paper examines the production mode choices of rural households with an emphasis on the 
role 
of human capital in the agricultural transformation process. Farm restructuring in Central and 
Eastern Europe has resulted in a broad range of farm types, such as co-operatives, partnerships, 
individual farms and combinations of those. The fact that resources are allocated into different 
production organization modes is attributed to the utility maximization strategy of heterogeneous 
agents deriving income from uncertain sources in the face of absent or imperfect factor markets. 
Empirical results from a multinomial logit model estimated with data from two-year nation-wide 
survey of Romanian farm households support the hypothesis that the outcome of the 
transformation 
process depends primarily on both the human capital characteristics of and economic risks faced 
by 
the households. 
Key Words: human capital, production organization, agricultural transition, Romania 
Correspondence address: 
Marian Rizov 
LICOS Centre for Transition Economics 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Deberiotstraat 34, 3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Tel. +3216324546 
marian.rizov@econ.kuleuven.ac.be 
* I acknowledge useful contributions of Erik Mathijs and Johan Swinnen to previous versions of the paper, however, 
all 
remaining errors are my responsibility. 
1 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ORGANIZATION IN 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES AND THE ROLE OF HUMAN CAPITAL: 
EVIDENCE FROM ROMANIA 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Under central planning, agricultural production was organized in large-scale collective and state 
farms. Economic reforms involved both the privatization of agricultural production assets and the 
restructuring of state and collective farms. Farm restructuring has resulted in several farm types, 
such as co-operatives, partnerships, individual farms and various combinations of them. A broad 
range of farm types can be found in most transition countries, but their relative importance differs 
considerably across the region (Swinnen et al., 1997). One of the countries with most variety in 
agricultural production organization is Romania, where besides the main farm organization types 
are also observed hybrid forms such as combination of individual farming and association 
farming 
and part time farming (MAF et al., 1997; Rizov et al., 2001). 
The incentive of a farm household to adopt a particular production organization is 
determined by the trade-off between the advantages and disadvantages characterizing each of the farm types. For example, advantages of individual farming include lower transaction costs 
associated with reduced inefficiencies due to the right of co-determination. Potential 
disadvantages 
include the loss of economies of scale in risk management, input purchasing, and marketing. 
Further, there might be “exit costs” for co-operative members to leave the collective farm, and 
“entry costs” to start up an individual farm. These costs are affected by land reform, privatization 
and transformation regulations (Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998). 
While the role of human capital during transition has been mentioned, no studies formally 
modeled or empirically estimated its impact on the agricultural production organization in 
transition 
economies. In the development literatur e, the role of human capital is emphasized in the 
“agricultural ladder” hypothesis (Spillman, 1919; Rao, 1971, Higgs, 1973; Reid, 1976). At the 
bottom of the ladder, agents with a low level of human capital are employed as landless hired 
workers. The next step up the ladder involves cultivating some land either individually under a 
sharecropping contract or under some other form of co-operation. For this, agents need to have a 
higher level of both farming skills and capital. The ladder’s top rang is the owner-operator. In 
related work, Hallagan (1978), Newbery and Stiglitz (1979) and Allen (1982) have developed 
screening models where different contracts are offered by landlords as way of screening tenants 
of 
different skills. 
This framework is useful for understanding the post-communist agricultural transformation 
process. New landowners face the choice of managing their land and acting as entrepreneurs, 
leasing their land (and labor) to other farms, or looking for alternative options to allocate their 
assets. The present paper develops a general model where the fact that resources are allocated 
into 
different production organizations can be attributed to a utility maximization strategy of 
households 
with different asset portfolios, both in terms of quality and quantity. Households that become 
individual operators are expected, relative to ones choosing co-operative farming, to possess 
greater 
business acumen as well as conventional labor force skills and greater access to financial capital, 
which minimizes their production risk exposure. The process is complicated by factor market 
imperfections characterizing transition. 
The generalization we introduce through our model includes (i) allowing agents to be risk 
averse in general and considering their risk premiums explicitly and (ii) allowing for different 
efficiency or farming skill levels across agents. The theory developed here provides an 
explanation 
of several production organization issues in transition agriculture such as the existence of hybrid 
modes of organization and the co-existence of different modes of organization. Furthermore, we 
examine empirically the production organization choices of rural households using unique two-
year 
household survey data from Romania, a country characterized by a variety of farm types. 
2 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the analytical framework is developed. In 
section 3, empirical tests are carried out using multinomial logit model. The estimation results are 
reported in section 4, followed by a discussion and conclusion in section 5. 
2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK Assumptions 
Human capital determines the farming, and in general managerial, skills of rural households.1 The 
market for managerial skills in agricultural production is imperfect due to two fundamental 
information problems. First, human capital, and thus managerial skills, vary widely across 
potential 
individual farmers, but cannot be judged ex ante (Johannisson and Senneseth, 1993; Knight, 
1957). 
Second, due to the high nature dependence of agricultural production, it is very difficult to 
measure 
managerial input ex post (Allen and Lueck, 1998; Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986; Feder, 
1985). 
As a result, Akerlof’s (1970) “lemon dilemma” applies to the market for managerial skills in 
agricultural production. 
The output from the household endowments of capital and labor depends, in general, on the 
farming efficiency or skills of the agent(s) managing the farm operation, on the economic risks 
under which household(s) operates, assuming the agent(s) is risk averse. Five modes of 
production 
organization are modeled: individual farm operation, co-operative farming, hybrid form of 
farming 
where individual farmers participate in a co-operative, part-time farming, and absentee 
landowners 
not engaged in farming at all. 
The stochastic output of the household, produced over a crop cycle, depends on the factor 
intensity measured by the labor input in farming (l) and the farming efficiency or skill level (e) of 
the party(s) managing different production organizations. In individual farming both labor input 
and managerial skills, determining farming efficiency, will be supplied by the household. In 
contrast, in co-operative farms the labor supplied is of wage type and usually is more narrowly 
specialized. Agricultural production also requires capital and several variable inputs such as 
machinery, seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. The use of these inputs depends on the level of 
technology and availability, which we assume fixed across the production organization modes.2 
Thus what we call the production function may alternatively be thought of as the reduced profit 
function and can be written as: 
q=ef(l), (1) 
where e is the efficiency or skill factor that is determined by the agent(s)’ human capital 
endowment 
and l is the labor input in farming.3 f is the production function for an agent(s) with efficiency 
factor e=1, and is assumed to be linearly homogenous, increasing, concave and twice 
differentiable 
in l. It is further assumed that f(0) is a positive constant equal to the required rate of return on the 
physical assets employed. 
When the agent solely manages the farm (as it is in the case of individual farming) the 
efficiency factor e would equal eI, corresponding to the individual farmer efficiency level. When 
farming is organizer in a co-operative most of the managerial and allocation decisions would be 
carried out collectively and the efficiency factor e would equal eA, which is assumed to be a 
constant and exogenous to the individual farmer’s efficiency level. In a hybrid mode of 
production 
organization, the managerial functions and thus the effects of efficiency factors, are divided between individual farming and co-operative farming, in proportions corresponding to the asset 
shares allocated to these production modes. Thus, if the individual farm share of assets is r and 
that 
of the association farm is (1-r), the efficiency factor e for the use of household assets is given by: 
1 Human capital also affects agent(s)’s off-farm employment opportunities. 
2 As in our analyzes here we are interested explicitly in the ability and effort of agent(s) as determinants of 
production 
organization in agriculture we have suppressed the capital inputs in our notation and consider them fixed. Moreover, 
this assumption is very reasonable for the economies in transition. However, in the empirical analysis we control 
explicitly for capital endowments. 
3 With the current state of technology, we assume the same level of labor intensity both in individual farms and in 
cooperative 
farms. The monitoring and moral hazard problems are associated mainly with application of farming skills 
and making managerial decisions, so that the factor intensity can be considered the same across the farm modes. 
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e=[(1-r)eA+r?eI]=[eA+r(?eI+eA)], (2) 
where ? is a multiplicative risk factor in individual farming, with a mean value of 1: E?=1. Thus 
in 
general, the output q of the household assets is given by: 
q=ef(l)=[eA+r(?eI+eA)]f(l). (3) 
Note that in equation (3) e reduces to eA when r=0 (association fa rming mode) and to ?eI when 
r=1 
(individual farming mode).4 Also note that when the household labor input is zero (with the 
managerial input being exogenous to the household as well), the production organization reduces 
to 
an absentee ownership mode. 
The household maximizes the expected utility, EU, of its income Y, given by: 
Y=RA+r?eIf(l)+(1-l)w (4) 
As a labor supplier, household has a fixed amount of total labor per period, which is 
normalized to 1 and a market determined opportunity cost w per unit of labor from working in the 
casual market where it can sell as much labor as it wants. Thus the household has a market 
determined reservation utility level, UM=U(w).5 Similar assumptions apply to the utility 
maximization of the household as a capital asset (land) owner. U in both situations is assumed to 
be 
increasing, concave and twice differentiable in its arguments. Note that the concavity assumption 
implies that in both aspects the household is risk averse. 
Household optimal organization 
We consider a two-stage decision problem of the household. In the first stage, the land owning 
household decides (binding decision) with respect to the share r of assets allocated to individual 
farming. The decision of the household is subject to expected utility EU, from the allocation 
being 
no less than its reservation utility, UM. The second stage takes r as given and the household 
chooses 
its farm labor, l. Using backward induction, we first analyze the second stage of the decision 
problem for arbitrary r and then we consider the first stage decision where the optimal share r*, is 
chosen. 
  The choice of farm labor input l: For given r, the household as labor supplier chooses l, so 




is the marginal risk premium of the household associated with production risk (0?p<<1) and fl is 
the 
derivative of f(l) with respect to l. Equation (5) suggests that in equilibrium, the household has to 
balance the benefit of increased input, l, against the cost of additional input, w.6 Thus , we have 
obtained the standard labor allocation equation where the marginal product of labor in farming is 
equalized with the price of labor, w. Finally, we can also write l as an indirect function of r so 
that 
l=l*(r), i.e., that for a given share, r, there is a unique optimal level of l that maximizes 
household 
utility. 
  The optimal choice of individual farming share r: Now we consider the first stage of the 
decision problem. In this stage the optimal level of share, r, is chosen so as to maximize the 
household’s expected utility: Maxr=EU[(1-r)eAf(l)+r?eIf(l)+(1-l)w], subject to l=l*(r). 
Differentiating with respect to r yields (assuming interior solution, r? (0,1)): 
EU’[-eAf(l)+(1-r)eAfl(l)lr+?eIf(l)+r?eIfl(l)lr-lrw]=0, (7) 
4 For simplicity of notation we do not distinguish formally between different types of household labor; l is labor input 
in 
farming and the reminder (1-l), if any, is the off-farm labor. 
5 In general, the wage rate, w, and reservation utility of different labor suppliers would vary with their level of skills 
and 
thus with their human capital. 
6 We assume that the following condition holds: eAf(l)>w(eI) for eI<eI^, where eI^ is a certain minimum level of skills 
required for entering the labor market. 
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where lr is the derivative of l with respect to r. Collecting terms containing lrEU’ and using 
equation (5), it can be seen that they add up to zero (implication of the envelope theorem). Then 
equation (7) simplifies to: -eAf(l)+(1-p)?eIf(l)=0 or 
(eI*-eA)f-peI*f=0, (8) 
where eI*=?eI and f=f(l) for simplicity of notation. 
Further, following Pratt (1964), in order to carry on our analysis, we substitute marginal risk 
premium, p, with Arrow-Pratt income risk premium, ? .7 For an agent facing a risky income of 
the 
form, ?B(r,l,…)+C(l,…), where ? is the multiplicative risk factor which has an expected value of 
one and C(l,…) represents terms independent of ?, the following relation holds in equilibrium: 
p=? r/Br. The subscripts on the functions denote partial differentiation with respect to the 
subscript. 
In our model B=r?eIf, thus at the equilibrium (i.e., at r=r* and l=l*), 
p=? r/?eIf. (9) 
Using equation (9) in equation (8) and substituting ?e/?r=(eI*-eA) yields the condition that 
have to be satisfied by the optimal share, r*: 
?/?r(ef-? )=0. (10) 
After substituting expressions for e and ? , normalizing the output f of an average farm to be 
1, dropping the constant term eAf, and multiplying by –1, the household’s objective function, B, 
can be written as: 
B=r2? (r=1)-r(eI*-eA) (11) 
Optimizing with respect to r yields: 
r*=(eI*-eA)/2? (r=1) (12) 
We can use this equation to obtain the optimal production organization for a variety of 
situations. As evident, in our model only the difference in skill levels, and not their absolute 
values, 
are relevant to production organization choice. The range of the risk premium is important to be 
considered as well. Several empirical studies (Nabi, 1986; Roumasset and Uy, 1987; Roumasset, 
1995) have suggested a range of the risk premium 5-20 percent of the output. 
Relative incidence of various production organization modes 
  The co-operative farming mode: The co-operative farming mode (r=0) is the optimal 
organization if the optimal allocation share (see equation (12)), r*? 0. That is if the numerator in 
equation (12) is zero or negative: 
eI*? eA (13) 
Thus, the main motivation for the co-operative farming mode is the higher efficiency of the 
cooperative 
compared to that of the individual farmer. 
  The individual farming mode: It follows from equation (12) that the individual farming 
mode is the optimal organization if r*? 1, that is, the numerator is greater than or equal to the 
denominator: 
eI*-eA?2? (r=1). (14) 
Note that in the first best world with zero risk premium, the right hand side of the above 
equation will be zero so that the individual farming mode will be optimal whenever eI*? eA. In the 
real world and especially in the conditions of economic transition, risk premium can be 
significant. 
Thus the individual farming mode can be optimal only when the farming efficiency of the 
household is superior to that of the association by a considerable amount. According to previous 
studies the difference in efficiency is about 20 percent (see, e.g., Mathijs and Swinnen, 2001). 
  The hybrid farming mode. The hybrid farming mode is optimal when 0<r*<1. Thus, by 
combining the results from (13) and (14), we can write the following condition for hybrid 
farming 
to be optimal: 
7 The Arrow-Pratt income risk premium (?) is defined by the condition that the expected utility of the risky income 
with 
no insurance should equal the utility of the expected income minus the risk premium. For small variances of income, 
Pratt (1964) has shown that the risk premium ?=0.5? ? , where ? is the degree of absolute risk aversion of the agent 
and 
? represents the variance of income. In our model ? is a function of r and ? can be written as: 
?(r)=0.5? ? (r?eI f)=0.5? r2? (?eIf)=r2 ?(r=1). 
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eI*-2? <eA<eI*. (15) 
Note that in the first best world (? =0), equation (15) implies that the hybrid mode of farming 
would be rarely observed as it is optimal only when eA=eI* (with the individual farming mode 
being 
optimal whenever eI*>eA and the association farming mode being optimal whenever eA>eI*). 
However, in the conditions of economic transition with high production risk, individual farming becomes less attractive due to the high risk premium of the individual farmer who absorbs the 
entire 
risk of agricultural production. In most cases, these costs decline as one moves towards a hybrid 
farming mode. Thus the latter may be optimal for a certain range of eI* above eA (given by 
equation 
14). Thus it can be seen that reduction in the risk costs that hybrid farming entails is the primary 
motivation for this mode of organization. 
At the same time, it should be noted that, on the average, a larger share r will be associated 
with a higher relative farming efficiency of the household (see equation 12).8 Our analysis 
suggests 
(as in the “agricultural ladder”) that least skilled households tend to farm in co-operation, 
medium 
skilled as hybrid farmers, and most skilled as individual farmers.9 Thus the hybrid farmers may 
be 
consistently less skilled than the individual farmers (as well as than part-time farmers). 
  Par-time individual farming and absentee landownership modes. From the result in 
equation (5) and related discussion, it is evident that when the marginal product of labor in 
farming 
is lower than the market wage, off- farm employment will be chosen. A realistic assumption is 
that 
w=w(eI), which implies that for households with higher eI the opportunity cost of labor will also 
increase. Thus at certain high levels of human capital, off-farm employment will become optimal. 
The existence of transaction costs and risk premium, explains the widely observed part-time 
individual farming organization mode.10 
Finally, it may be worth nothing here that risk premium, ? (=0.5? ? ) can be higher for one 
agent than for another either because he is more risk-averse (? =-U’’/U’ is higher, i.e., the utility 
function is more concave) or because he faces higher variance, ? , in his income. From above 
analysis, it is evident that as the risk premium of the household increases, the incidence of hybrid 
and part-time farm organizations increase as well. 
3 EMPIRICAL TESTS, DATA AND VARIABLES 
To analyze empirically the household choices, we apply the approach of Domenicich and 
McFadden (1975), where the differences across organization modes follow a logistic distribution 
function. The multinomial logit model is then the appropriate technique for estimating 
determinants 
of the household choice of production organization mode. The relative likelihood of each mode is 
measured as the likelihood of the mode considered relative to the base mode which here is the 
cooperative 
farming. 
We use data from two nation-wide surveys of Romanian farm households. The first, was 
organized in 1996 by the Romanian Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF), the World Bank, 
and 
co-sponsored by the European Union. The second survey was organized in 1998 by the Policy 
Research Group (PRG) and financed by the European Union. The sample is comprised of 754 
randomly selected rural households that were surveyed both in 1996 and 1998. 
  The dependent variable (ORG) reflects the organization choice of the rural households. It 
is discrete with five categories representing the options of each household (see table 1 for 
details). These are: co-operative farming (COOP_F), leasing out/absentees (ABSENTE), full- time 
individual 
8 Considering the numerator in equation (12), eA is quite stationary and the change in eI* is the factor driving the 
change 
in r*. Moreover, ? is likely to be smaller for richer households with higher eI*. 
9 When the opportunity cost of labor (off-farm wage) exceeds the marginal product of farming, part-time farming and 
absentee landownership organization modes will be observed. 
10 Transaction costs exist in both sides of the allocation equation. For example, there are search and transport costs in 
the wage employment side (see, e.g., for relevant discussion Lopez, 1986). In the production side, well-known 
market 
imperfections such as labor heterogeneity and moral hazard exist (see, e.g., Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986 and 
Heltberg, 1998). 
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farming (FULTM_F), part-time individual farming (PARTM_F), and hybrid farming 
(HYBRD_F). 
Because the number of observations in the mode COOP_F in 1998 is only 3, we can only 
estimate 
the model using a pooled sample for both years.11 
We use three sets of explanatory variables: human capital variables, physical capital and 
finance variables and variables concerning the socio-economic environment. In table 2, we report 
summary statistics and give description of the explanatory variables while in table 3, we report 
the 
means and standard deviations of the explanatory variables for each of the production 
organization 
modes identified. 
  Human capital variables: Measuring human capital and managerial skills, respectively, is 
difficult (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1999; Wydick, 1999). We consider two separate sets of 
human capital variables for each household. In the first set, individual characteristics are 
averaged 
over all adult household members. The second set contains only information about the household 
head. Using average human capital characteristics may mask variations within the household. 
The 
head of the household is likely to have more decision-making power than other household 
members. Thus, using two alternative specifications allows us to derive conclusions about the 
intrahousehold 
decision-making. Age, education and broader labor market experience are used as 
proxies of human capital and managerial skills.12 
Age is a commonly used measure for general work experience. However, above certain 
level, it may be negatively correlated with agent’s attitudes toward risk and motivation of being a 
farmer. Both age of the household head (AGEHH) as main decision-maker and average age of 
adult household members (AGEHM) are used in different specifications. As possible non- 
linearity 
in the impact of age is captured through the variation of production organization modes, square 
terms of age variables are not included in the regressions. 
Education, measured in years of schooling, is expected to have a positive impact on the 
ability of an agent to start up a business in general. At the same time, however, higher level of 
education would imply higher opportunity cost of labor of an agent as wage earner, thus making 
off-farm occupations relatively more attractive. This hypothesis is tested by including in the regression the years of schooling of the household head (EDUHH) and alternatively average 
years 
of schooling of household members (EDUHM).13 
Broader work experience is expected to have an important influence on the cho ice of 
production organization mode. To capture this effect, we introduced two dummy variables. The 
first, COMUTHH (COMUTHM), is calculated for the household head and for the household, 
respectively, and equals one if there has been commuting before 1989 for work to a town but 
otherwise residing in a village. We expect that people working in a town, while living in a rural 
area would have more diverse experience and connections, and hence relatively higher 
managerial 
skills. The second variable, MIGRATE, equals one if the household has migrated from a town to 
a 
village after 1989, the beginning of the reforms, and is expected to have a negative impact on 
individual farming as it suggests a lack of experience within agriculture. 
  Physical capital and finance variables: Owning assets has an important impact on agent’s 
decisions what organization mode he/she will choose as capital endowments affect the agent’s 
attitude towards risk. Furthermore, the ownership of assets secures the access and their use on the 
farm when markets for these assets are still missing or ill functioning. In the same time farm 
assets 
11 A year dummy variable is introduced in the regressions. Assuming that with time markets in transition economies 
develop, such a dummy variable can be interpreted as an indicator of a decrease in transaction costs and the risk 
premium required by the households. 
12 We also experimented with a dummy variable for the gender of the household hear. As this variable did not show 
to 
be significant, we excluded it from the final specification. 
13 Following Jolliffe (1997) and Yang (1997), an alternative measure, the schooling of the most educated member of 
the 
household, was also used in sensitivity analysis and yielded results consistent with other measures. Furthermore, 
besides the variables included in the regressions reported here, we have experimented with the education of parents 
as a 
proxy of family background. In all cases this variable was not significant and therefore was not included in the final 
specification. 
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can be used as collateral for securing loans and thus soften the liquidity constraint.14 Having in 
mind the specific conditions in Romania during the period of analysis we assume that the asset 
variables are exogenous to the household. We use, as controls in the regressions, variables 
measuring labor, land, farm machinery and buildings owned by the household. 
Household labor supply (ADULTS) is measured by the number of household members in 
working age, i.e. between 15 and 65 years. Due to the nature of agricultural production, the 
relation 
of household labor with individual farming modes is expected to be positive, as more labor 
available within the household would imply more opportunity for carrying on and expanding an 
individual farming operation. In the same time, more labor available would imply higher 
likelihood 
of diversification and undertaking off- farm occupation. 
Land owned by the household (OWNLAND) is traditionally the main agricultural asset. 
Availability of a larger land holding is hypothesized to have a positive impact on individual 
farming 
by relaxing liquidity constraints. However, if the amount of land is not matched by the quantity and 
quality of other farm assets and farmer’s managerial skills, then modes other than only farming 
individually might be chosen. 
Farm machinery is an important asset for every farmer affecting technology and 
effectiveness of production. In the economies in transition it is also often used as collateral for 
securing loans. As a proxy for the size of owned farm machinery, we constructed a weighted 
index 
(MACHINERY), which reflects the presence of six machinery and equipment items (trucks, 
tractors, ploughs, combines, carriages, sowing equipment). The following weights were used: 
truck 
= 1, tractor = 1, plough for tractor = 0.2, combine for cereals = 2, carriage = 0.5, sowing machine 
= 
1. The variable thus ranges from 0 to 5.7. 
Farm buildings are another asset important for the production process and their availability 
also affects credit constraints. As a proxy for the size of owned farm buildings (BUILDINGS), 
we 
constructed an unweighted index for four building items (cattle stables, storage facilities, sheep 
shelters and multipurpose sheds). This variable ranges between 0 and 4. 
Security of land tenure is an important consideration with respect to land ownership. 
Availability of legal land title directly affects the agent’s attitude towards risk. Thus, secure 
property rights are an important precondition to set up an individual farm, and hence a positive 
relation with the level of individual farming is expected. In the same time, secure land title will 
facilitate land leasing, thus making more likely part-time farming and absentee land ownership. 
We 
introduced a dummy variable (TITLE), which equals one if a legal title on the farmland exists in 
1996 and zero otherwise. 
  Socio-economic environment variables: Characteristics of the environment within which 
the farm household operates affect importantly both the agent’s managerial skills and attitudes 
towards risk. We use proxies for market access, for tradition and experience with individual 
farming at county level, and for the effect of the adva ncement in transition process. 
Market access (ACCESS) is a measure of the imperfections and accessibility of the markets 
in which the households operate.15 It is an index variable that ranges between 4 and 13 with larger 
values associated with shorter distance to the nearest town market and railway station. We expect 
a 
positive correlation of this variable with the individual farming mode because better access to 
markets will lower transaction costs for individual farm operators. A good access to markets, 
however, may facilitate the attractiveness of other production organization modes, particularly 
those 
involving off-farm work. 
Tradition of individual farming (FTRADITION) is proxied by the pre-reform (in 1985) 
share of land in individual farms at county level. There was a wide regional variation (between 
14 It is a common practice in the economies in transition, including Romania, that for lending banks require collateral. 
Most of the loans are secured by machinery and buildings but land with legal title is also accepted. 
15 This variable might well be related also to price levels that would influence farm profitability. Because of the lack 
of 
price information in our data set it is not possible to separate out this effect. One can argue, however, that the price 
effect is not important because there is no significant regional price variation in Romania due to government policy 
of equal prices between regions during and before the period when the survey was carried out. 
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0.03% and 40.67%) in the level of individual farming during the communist period in Romania. 
In 
counties with more individual farms the farming skills are expected to be more appropriate for 
present conditions and also the attitudes towards risk more in favor to individual farming modes. 
Effect of the transition process on agricultural production organization is proxied by a 
dummy variable (TIME), which is equal to one for observations in 1998 and zero otherwise. 
Assuming advancement in economic reforms with time, we would expect positive time effect on 
individual farming modes. However, the development of markets would also improve off-farm 
opportunities. 
4 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We report in tables 4 and 5 the estimation results for the likelihood of choosing among the five 
modes of production organization analyzed in the previous sections and the relative importance 
of 
factors influencing the decisions. In table 4 the measures of human capital are based on 
household 
head characteristics, while in table 5 the average household human capital characteristics are 
used. 
The results of both specifications by and large are robust and consistent with the theoretical 
model. 
The coefficients of the human capital variables have got the expected signs, however, their 
significance vary between the two specifications. When the household head characteristics are 
considered, the age is the most important determinant of the production organization choice, 
while 
when the average household characteristics are used, education is of the highest significance. In 
general, it seems that the human capital of the household is more important in making production 
organization choices than the characteristics of the household head alone. Therefore, we discuss 
further the results based on the average household characteristics, as reported in table 5. 
Column 1 examines the probability of being a hybrid farmer relative to farming only in a 
cooperative 
farm. Education variable has a positive coefficient, significant at 0.01 level. Significant 
(at the 0.10 level) and positive is also the coefficient of the dummy variable showing the diverse 
experience gathered through commuting for work in town. It is possible that the behavior of 
hybrid 
farmers is determined by their general knowledge and connections (social capital), which allows 
them to cope with production risks better than association farmers. 
From farm physical capital variables, OWNLAND and BUILDINGS have got significant 
and positive coefficients. Availability of a legal title on land has also significant positive effect on 
starting up an individual farm. This together with the negative (but not significant) coefficients of 
ADULTS and MACHINERY is in support to the hypothesis that hybrid farming may be a 
phenomenon occurring due to relatively insufficient appropriate human capital, and thus farming 
skills, available on-farm relative to the farm physical capital endowment. 
Further, the better access to markets, tradition with individual farming and advancement in 
reforms all play significantly positive role in determining the choice of the hybrid farming, 
compared with the association farming. These results confirm that even households with 
moderate farming skills would be able to cope better with production risks when general economic 
conditions 
improve. 
The results for the full-time individual farming mode, reported in column 2 are of special 
interest, as the households that have chosen to farm full-time individually represent the largest 
proportion (59.28%) of the sample. In addition, the transition from collective to individual 
farming 
is in the focus of policies for agricultural transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Human capital variables play important role in general. However, the age variable despite 
having the expected negative sign is not statistically significant. Education has a highly 
significant 
positive sign and supports the hypothesis that the individual farmers are characterized by better 
education implying higher managerial skills. However, it would not imply that an increase in the 
years of schooling increases the attractiveness of full-time individual farming in a linear manner 
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(point estimate 0.2321) relative to being a part-time farmer (column 3, point estimate 0.3511).16 
As 
common sense suggests, more diversified work experience, represented by pre-reform 
commuting 
for work in town, increases the probability of possessing a higher managerial skills and social 
capital, thus undertaking individual farming. 
The coefficients of the physical capital variables are positive but only machinery and 
household labor are statistically significant. The availability of legal land title has also a 
significant 
positive impact and indicates that better land tenure security decreases risk in farming. Thus, the 
point estimate here (0.9678) is higher than for the hybrid farming mode (0.7850) implying that 
farmers use the co-operation as a risk management strategy. Furthermore, having secure access to 
physical capital decreases the risk of agricultural production in general. 
From socio-economic environment characteristics, the variables representing market access 
and advancement of transition process are significant and positive. The coefficient of tradition 
with 
individual farming is not significant despite having the positive sign. 
Column 3 shows the results for the probability of becoming a part-time farmer relative to 
joining an association. To make comparisons to the probability of being full-time farmer, we 
must 
compare the coefficient in column 3 to the corresponding coefficient in column 2. Doing so 
indicates that the human capital variables such as age and education are even more important 
determinants of the part-time farming choice as the directions of the effects are the same. The age 
coefficient here is negative and significant indicating that part-time farmers are much younger 
that 
all other involved in farming. The positive coefficient of EDUHM in column 3 must be 
interpreted 
in similar fashion as with the full-time farmers. As common sense suggests, better education 
increases the probability of working off- farm relative to being a full- time farmer. In addition, 
parttime 
farmers have also more diversified work experience gathered through commuting for work to a 
town. The possession of physical capital, such as farm machinery and buildings together with 
security of land tenure plays a significant positive role in carrying some farming. However, when 
the number of household members in working age is relatively large it is more likely that some of 
them find occupation off- farm. 
As with the full-time individual farmers, from socio-economic environment characteristics, 
the variables representing market access and advancement of transition process are significant 
and 
positive. The coefficient of tradition with individual farming is not significant. 
Column 4 shows the determinants of the odds of being an absentee landowner relative to 
becoming a co-operative farmer. From a statistical point of view, the most significant of the 
human 
capital variables are both age and education. The positive sign of age implies that the group of 
absentees consists, besides agents with high opportunity costs, of retired people that already left 
the 
labor market. Also it is more likely that a household would chose this mode if it migrated from a 
town and thus had no farm experience. The sign of the age variable might reflect also an 
increased 
desire for security as age increases and thus less motivatio n to carry on risky individual farming. 
With respect to physical capital variables, it is worth mentioning that all of them have the 
expected signs but are not significant except land title where the coefficient exceeds its standard 
error with a factor of four. The availability of legal land title has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient meaning that an important condition for existence of the group of 
absentees 
leasing their total land out is the security of land tenure. 
Finally, the socio-economic environment variables have similar impact as in the case with 
part-time farmers. In addition to those, the lack of tradition with individual farming plays here a 
significant role. 
16 The reason is that, in general, the log of the odds of being, for example, a part-time farmer relative to becoming a full-time 
farmer 





j x 1 ) ( ? ? , where the superscripts PF and FF denote part-time farmers and full-time farmers, respectively. 
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our model and empirical analysis show that low skilled households are more likely to adopt 
cooperative 
farming mode; those with medium skill levels will be hybrid farmers. Individual farmers 
will have even higher skills and reservation utility, which is in support to the “agricultural ladder” 
hypothesis (Spillman, 1919; Reid, 1979). However, households with higher skills can be 
expected 
to have higher opportunity costs and thus opt for off-farm employment as well. Absentee 
landowner group seems to be mixed by including also retired ho useholds but it is confirmed that 
they possess also high general human capital endowment but no specific farm experience. 
In this context, our analysis provides information about the factors that determine 
production organization choices of rural househo lds. Human capital endowments generally have significant effect on the choice of production organization. Young and well-educated agents are 
more likely to start up an individual farm but also to opt for off- farm jobs, fact which is reflected 
in 
the large and significant coefficients for part-time individual farmer group. Considering 
household 
human capital measures, age does not play a significant role in the choice between co-operative, 
hybrid or individual farming. However, hybrid and full-time individual farmers are somewhat 
better educated than co-operative farmers. The higher importance of the average education of the 
household, compared to the education of the household head alone, implies that intra household 
decision-making is quite democratic and that there is an active exchange of knowledge within the 
household. Diversified work experience matters for the choice on the co-operative-individual 
farming continuum. Agents who commuted for work to a town and who did not migrate from 
elsewhere are more likely to start up their own individual farm. Finally, larger households are 
more 
likely to engage in both individual farming and off-farm work. 
Controlling for physical capital endowments shows that those variables also play a 
significant role in the household’s choice of production organization, which suggests that factor 
markets are missing or ill functioning. Individual farmers, part-time or full- time, distinguish 
themselves from hybrid and co-operative farmers by owning more farm machinery and by having 
more secure land titles. Land holdings and farm buildings have most significant impact for 
choosing hybrid farming mode. This result is in agreement with the human capital effects and the 
thesis that the farm households endowed with physical capital in excess of their farming 
capability 
will opt for some form of co-operative farming. It is noteworthy that co-operative and hybrid 
farmers have less secure land title thus facing higher risks. 
Finally, the socio-economic environment seems to have played an important role in 
affecting the required risk premium of agents. The market access is important for opting out of 
cooperative 
farming and starting an individual farm. However, in the same time market access 
improves off-farm employment opportunities as well. The tradition of individual farming at 
county 
level is only important for becoming a hybrid farmer while the lack of such a tradition implies 
more 
absentee landowners. Overall, with the advancement of transition process the pure co-operative 
farming mode is likely to be replaced by other modes predominantly hybrid farming as well as 
individual farming. 
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Distribution of households among five organization modes 
1996 1998 Total sample Organization Mode 
Number % Number % Number % 
COOP_F 33 4.57 3 0.42 36 2.49 
HYBRD_F 115 15.93 147 20.36 262 18.14 
FULTM_F 432 59.83 424 58.73 856 59.28 
PARTM_F 117 16.20 131 18.14 248 17.17 
ABSENTE 25 3.46 17 2.35 42 2.91 
Total 722 100.00 722 100.00 1444 100.00 
TABLE 2 
Means and standard deviations of the explanatory variables 
Variable Definition Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
AGEHH Age of household head 65.81 
(11.49) 
EDUHH Number of years of schooling of household head 6.39 
(3.25) 
COMUTHH Dummy variable equal to 1 if household head has 
commuted to a town for work before 1989 and 0 otherwise 
0.17 
(0.37) 
AGEHM Average age of household members 58.54 
(14.79) 




COMUTHM Dummy variable equal to 1 if household members have 
commuted to a town for work before 1989 and 0 otherwise 
0.30 
(0.45) 
MIGRATE Dummy variable equal to 1 if household migrated from a 
town after 1989 and 0 otherwise 
0.09 
(0.28) 
ADULTS Number of household members in working age, between 15 and 65 
3.11 
(2.99) 
OWNLAND Hectares of land owned by the household 3.15 
(2.11) 
MACHINERY Equivalent number of machinery owned 0.21 
(0.55) 
BUILDINGS Equivalent number of buildings owned 2.19 
(1.13) 
TITLE Dummy variable equal to 1 if household possesses legal 
title in 1996 and 0 otherwise 
0.38 
(0.48) 
ACCESS Index measuring the access to markets 10.32 
(3.52) 
FTRADITION Pre-reform (1985) level of individual farming, % 10.20 
(11.17) 
TIME Time dummy variable equal to 1 for observations in 1998 





Means and standard deviations of the variables by production organization mode 
Production organization mode (ORG) 





























































































































































Multinomial logit analysis of households’ organization probabilities 
(with household head human capital) 









































































































Number of observations 1444 
Log Likelihood -1315.98 
Pseudo R2 0.107 
Notes. 
1) The outcome “COOP_F” is the comparison group. 
2) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level of significance, 
respectively. Thus each column shows the determinants of the log of the ratio of the probability of choosing the 




Multinomial logit analysis of households’ organization probabilities 
(with household human capital) 










































































































Number of observations 1444 
Log Likelihood -1411.81 
Pseudo R2 0.114 
Notes. 
1) The outcome “COOP_F” is the comparison group. 
2) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * denote 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level of significance, 
respectively. Thus each column shows the determinants of the log of the ratio of the probability of choosing the 
organization described at the top of the column to the probability of choosing “COOP_F”. Variables are defined in 
table 2. 
 